We 
Introduction
Determining the reaction of monetary authorities to changes in fundamental economic variables has long been a goal of fed watchers and monetary economists. In particular, economists have focused on how the Federal Reserve Bank responds to economic fundamentals when determining the short term interest rates. The majority of this research is based on the monetary policy rule introduced by Taylor (1993) . This is an algebraic, linear rule and is defined as it = r* + πt + α (πt -π*) + βỹt , where i is the nominal Federal funds rate, r* is the target real federal funds rate, πt is the inflation rate over the last four quarters, π* is the target inflation rate and ỹ is the percentage deviation of real GDP from the target real GDP. Taylor sets both the target real federal funds rate and the target inflation rate equal to 2 and puts equal weights, 0.5, on deviation from the inflation target and deviation from the real GDP target. While this original specification seemed robust using the data from 1987 to 1993, it became clear as more data accumulated over time that modification of the original rule was required.
In order to improve the performance of the rule, it became almost standard to add lagged values of the federal funds rate as explanatory variables. 2 The economic interpretation of this addition is that the Fed smoothes interest rates over time, moving gradually towards the target.
Lately, however, this practice has been questioned. In particular, Rudebusch (2002) argued that if the fed does indeed smooth interest rates, the addition of the lagged federal funds rate to the monetary rule should increase our ability to forecast the future federal funds rate. He finds that this is not the case and hence concludes that the statistical significance of the lagged federal funds rate in the regressions is actually due to highly serially correlated errors. 3 Another direction that has been explored by a number of researchers is potential nonlinearity of the Taylor rule. There are several reasons why a nonlinear specification might seem reasonable.
The standard derivation of the Taylor rule posits a Federal Reserve loss function that depends on the squared deviation of inflation from the target and the square of the output gap. The solution from this quadratic specification is a linear Taylor rule similar to the original Taylor (1993) rule. There are, however, many reasons to suppose that this linear framework is problematic. Among them is the possibility that the effect of the federal funds rate on the output gap or on the inflation rate may not be linear; for example it may be more difficult to eliminate a negative output gap than a positive gap, or, as a number of theoretical and empirical papers suggest, inflation may increase more readily than it decreases. Another cause for nonlinearity in the Taylor rule might be that the Fed's loss function is asymmetric, suggesting that the Fed has higher tolerance for inflation that is slightly below the target than inflation that is slightly above the target. 4 Yet another potential cause for nonlinearities is uncovered in a number of papers which find that several key macroeconomic variables follow asymmetric paths over the course of the business cycle. These nonlinearities can manifest themselves in a nonlinear Taylor rule.
Finally, nonlinearity of the Taylor rule could be caused by the fact that the parameters are not stable over time. 5 The goal of this paper is to carry out a thorough statistical analysis of the data in an attempt to determine whether a stable linear or nonlinear relationship does in fact exist. We describe the data and perform some preliminary tests for stationarity in Section 2. In Section 3, we show that there is no meaningful cointegrating relationship between inflation, output gap and federal funds rates. 6 Without cointegration, any estimated relationship between the variables is 4 See Surico (2004 ) for an exploration of this avenue. 5 One type of nonlinearity which is almost always incorporated in models of monetary policy is permanent regime shifts. These are believed to be caused by policy changes due to changes in the chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank or changes of power in Congress and/or the White House which may have driven the Federal Reserve bank to change its policies. Papers by Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Naveira (2004) , Kim, Osborne and Sensier (2004) , Nobay and Peel (2003) , and Ruge-Murcia (2003) consider other types of nonlinearity. 6 A similar result has been obtained by Ősterholm (2005). spurious, calling into question whether a Taylor rule exists. To obtain additional insight into the failure of the cointegration tests, we carry out recursive estimates of the (invalid) equation to get a sense of how the parameter estimates change over time. Since the lack of cointegration could be caused by missing variables, in Section 4, we investigate several plausible candidate variables without success. Next, we examine the possibility of structural breaks in the data. All empirical work in this area has estimated the Taylor rule for limited periods of time under the assumption that there have been several permanent regime shifts, mostly in connection with shifts in the leadership of the Federal Reserve Bank. Nevertheless, when we use break dates coinciding with changes in the chairmanship of the Fed, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. We consider the possibility that the data appears not to be cointegrated because the shifts are placed at incorrect dates. Instead of using intuitive break dates obtained by looking at events, we also use a data-driven selection method due to Bai and Perron (2003) .
This does not change the result that there is no stable cointegration relationship.
In the final portion of Section 4, we investigate the possibility that the Taylor rule should be modeled as a nonlinear relationship. The tests indicate that there are indeed nonlinearities in the model, but do not seem to indicate that one specific parameter is the cause. We therefore proceed to investigate the possibility that a threshold model is a reasonable approach to modeling the determination of the federal funds rate; that is, if a given variable exceeds a threshold, the Fed reacts in one manner, and otherwise it has a different response. We find that when the inflation is low (less than about 2.3%) the Fed does not interfere at all, but when inflation is high, a relationship similar to the standard Taylor rule holds! This model makes significant progress towards explaining the misspecifications of the standard model, such as seemingly unreasonable high smoothing of the interest rates, unstable parameter estimates and lack of cointegration. While it is not, to our knowledge, possible to formally test whether this model is stable over the long run, informal checks seem to indicate that this might indeed be the case. Conclusions and directions for further research are contained in Section 5.
The Data
The data we used was obtained from FRED II (Federal Reserve Economic Data) . 7 We have quarterly observations from 1954:3 to 2003:4. We chose to follow the variable definitions used in Rudebusch (2002) . Specifically, inflation is constructed using the chain-weighted GDP deflator (pt) and the four-quarter inflation rate, πt, is computed as the simple average of the individual inflation rates. Hence, 
We did not include a deterministic time trend since there is little reason to believe that any of the variables are trend stationary. The lag length n was selected by the general-to-specific methodology. Beginning with n = 7, we tested the statistical significance of βn using the 5% significance level. If βn was not statistically different from zero, we reduced n by 1 and repeated the procedure until βn was statistically significant. Given this lag length, we then obtained the tstatistic (denoted by τ ) for the null hypothesis ρ = 0. The number of lags and the estimated values of ρ and τ are given in Table 1 for various sample periods.
From the results presented in Table 1 , it is clear that the federal funds rate and the weighted inflation rate show little evidence of mean reversion over any sample period. In particular, this is true for both of the samples beginning with Alan Greenspan's tenure as Fed chairman in 1987:4. For the output gap, however, the results of the Dickey-Fuller tests are very dependent on the sample period under consideration. For example, the output gap shows some evidence of mean reversion over the very long sample periods. Although we cannot reject the unit-root hypothesis for the samples beginning in 1979:4, there appears to be strong evidence of mean reversion for the samples beginning with 1983:1. Moreover, if we begin with 1981:1 (a date not shown in the table), or in 1987:4 (as Rudebusch did), the unit-root hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Notice that ρ is actually positive for the 1987:4 − 1994:4 period.
We have now completed thorough testing for unit roots, using the standard textbook methods.
Because much of what follows relies on the fact that the series are indeed I(1), we will proceed a little further using the latest techniques for unit root testing. In a recent paper Müller and Elliott (2003) highlighted the dependence of the power of unit root tests on the deviation of the initial observation of the series from its underlying deterministic component. They show that the Dickey-Fuller test we employed above has excellent power properties for large values of this initial deviation, while the test proposed by Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) (henceforth ERS) is optimal when the initial deviation is 0. A recent paper by Harvey and Leybourne (2003) (henceforth HL) proposes a unit root test which combines the strengths of the two statistics. An additional issue which deserves mention is that in the presence of structural breaks and neglected nonlinearities, unit root tests will have reduced power. We will examine breaks and nonlinearities in some of the discussion below. For now, we continue to work with the data under the assumption that the three series are best characterized as I(1) variables. In this case, equation (1) does not describe a valid long run relationship between the variables unless they are cointegrated. We explore this issue in the next section.
Testing for a Taylor rule
Given the results of the Dickey-Fuller tests, it, πt, and yt appear to be nonstationary. As such, the relationship represented by (1) is spurious unless the variables are cointegrated. Thus, to establish the existence of a Taylor rule, it is necessary to verify that the variables are cointegrated. Moreover, even if it, yt and πt are cointegrated, inference cannot be conducted using traditional t-tests unless the regressors are weakly exogenous and the errors are serially uncorrelated.
Notice that (1) is not conducive to testing for cointegration. One problem is that it is I(1) and ∆it is I(0). Hence, in (1), there is necessarily a cointegration relationship between the left-hand-side variable it and the right-hand-side variable it-1. Thus, there must be two cointegrating relationships among the variables in (1) if it is to be cointegrated with yt and πt. By estimating
(1) using OLS, one cannot hope to uncover the two separate cointegrating relationships.
Instead, it seems more appropriate to use the Johansen (1998, 1991) methodology to check for cointegrating relationships of the form: it = a0 + απt + βỹt . Lag lengths for the Johansen test were selected using the general-to-specific strategy in such a way as to minimize the multivariate Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 8 The results for the various sample periods are reported in Columns 6 − 8 show the estimated parameters of the (potential) cointegrating vector.
Notice that the Taylor Chairman. As shown in last two rows of Table 2 , the sample values for λmax(0) are both well below the 10% critical value of 19.77.
8 We also used the lag lengths selected by the multivariate Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). The results were sufficiently similar that we do not report them here. In the few cases where there were significant autocorrelations in the residuals, additional lags were added to eliminate the problem.
In our view, it strains credibility to argue that the results support the existence of a Taylor rule during the entire Volcker-Greenspan period. Nevertheless, someone might be tempted claim that the use of the two subsamples results in enough loss of power such that Johansen test is not able to detect a significant cointegrating relationship. To challenge this claim, notice that the estimated cointegrating relationship for the 1983:1 − 2003:4 period is:
Consider the estimates of the error-correcting model (with t-statistics in parentheses):
Even though the Johansen test is unable to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration, this model does not tally with our requirements for a Taylor rule. The first issue is that since the coefficient -0.035 on the error-correction component of the federal funds rate is insignificant, the federal funds rate is weakly exogenous. Hence, the point estimates suggest that the federal funds rate does not respond to a deviation from the cointegrating relationship. This is clearly inconsistent with the spirit of a Taylor rule. Furthermore, the t-statistic for the speed-ofadjustment coefficient for the four-quarter inflation rate provides mild evidence that inflation responds to a discrepancy from the equilibrium relationship by moving in the 'wrong' direction. For example, if inflation is 1 percentage point higher than that suggested by the longrun relationship, it is estimated that inflation increases by another 0.05 (0.016*3.07 ≅ 0.049) of a percentage point. Finally, the output gap does respond significantly and in the correct direction to restore long-run equilibrium. For example, if the output gap is one unit higher than that suggested by the long-run relationship, is estimated that the gap decreases by 0.15 units (1.06*1.44 ≅ 0.15). Unfortunately, given the prolonged nature of the business expansion in the Clinton period, this speed of adjustment seems overly strong. Overall, (2) is more likely to be an output determination equation than a Taylor rule.
As shown on the right-hand side of Table 2 , a similar pattern emerges when we examine the forward-looking version of the Taylor rule given by it = a0 + απt+1 + βỹt+1. Of course, the large sample properties of the cointegration tests are identical since cointegration between variables yt and xt, implies cointegration between yt and xt+1. Again, cointegration fails for most of the early periods. For our purposes, the important point is that there does not appear to be a significant cointegrating relationship for any period beginning in 1983:1 or 1987:4.
To better understand the failure of the Taylor (1) for parameter stability. First, however, we re-estimated equation (1) Diagnostic checking indicated no remaining serial correlation in the residuals. Estimation over the entire sample period also suggested the second lag was appropriate, and we will therefore proceed with the specification in (3) below.
To examine (3) for parameter stability, we performed recursive estimates of the Taylor clearly reveals that the intercept term seems to drift downward beginning in 1995. The implication is that the Federal Reserve's inflation target was lowered over this part of the sample period. In addition the point estimate of the coefficient on inflation in the early part of the sample is significantly above that in the latter part. This indicates that the Federal Reserve responded less severely to deviations of inflation from the target in the late 1990's than in the earlier part of the sample period. Finally, there is a significant and steady decline in the coefficient on the output gap as well as a sharp increase in the sum of the coefficients on the lagged interest rates beginning in 1995. Thus, the phenomenon of interest rate smoothing was far more marked in the latter part of the sample than the earlier part.
The point is that the Federal Reserve seemed more responsive to current economic phenomena in the early 1990s than the late 1990s. The late 1990s are characterized by high degrees of interest rate smoothing and low degrees of responsiveness to deviations of inflation from target and to the output gap. Hence, even though the output gap declined substantially, the Federal
Reserve's response was limited.
To summarize, since the variables are best modeled as I (1) (3) does not provide a stable relationship between the relevant variables, we are left with two possibilities: The first is that (3) is misspecified in some manner and therefore does not provide the desired long run relationship. The other, more disturbing possibility (to economists anyway), is that there is no fixed rule governing how the fed determines interest rates. Before resigning ourselves to the second possibility, we will thoroughly explore the first. In the next section we will explore possible misspecifications which might be the cause of the parameter instability as well as the lack of cointegration.
The Search For the Missing Money Rule
In this section, we will explore a number of possible causes for misspecification of (3) with the hope of finding a specification which leads to a stable cointegration relationship and parameter estimates which do not vary systematically over time. First, we focus on the possibility of a missing variable from the standard Taylor rule specification. Next we consider the possibility that the break dates determined by looking at significant economic events are wrong. Instead of relying on intuition we apply several data-driven methods to choose the break dates. Finally, we will proceed to explore the possibility that it is the assumption of linearity which leads to misspecification. In Section 4.3 we will discuss potential causes for nonlinearity and examine several nonlinear extensions of equations (1) and (3).
An examination of the variables
One possible cause of misspecification is that there is a variable missing from the standard Taylor rule specification. Suppose that the Federal Reserve is concerned about the magnitude of the output gap, the inflation rate, and a third macroeconomic variable. The omission of this key variable from (2) could explain the findings of the previous section.
Changes in the magnitude of this variable would manifest themselves as structural breaks in the standard specification, leading to parameter instability. If changes in this third variable were persistent, the federal funds rate would appear to be persistent. Finally, if there were a single cointegrating relationship between these three variables and the federal funds rate, the rate would not be cointegrated with the output gap and inflation.
We obtained several likely candidates for the missing variable. In testimony to congress, talks, speeches and interviews, Chairman Alan Greenspan indicated that the Federal Reserve was concerned about the so-called 'irrational exuberance' of the stock market. Since 'irrational exuberance' is not a well-defined concept, we tried several different measures. One natural measure is a run-up of stock prices relative to earnings. As such, we obtained Shiller's (2000) quarterly values of the price-earnings ratio over the 1881:1− 2003:4 period. 9 The variable is constructed as the real value of the S & P Composite Index (SP) divided by the total real value of the earnings of the companies included in the index. As discussed in more detail below, we also used several measures of actual movements in SP. happen to interest rates for borrowing money during the next 12 months−−will they go up, stay the same, or go down?" We used the proportion of people indicating that rates will go up.
Prior to introducing the price-earnings ratio into equation (3) we performed standard unit-root tests, which indicated that {SPt} behaves as an I(1) variable over the sample periods under consideration. As such, we used the Johansen (1988, 1991) The point estimates are such that the federal funds rate is predicted to decline as SPt increases.
In fact, the point estimates of the SPt coefficients reported in Table 5 are quite consistent over the various sample periods. The possible explanation is that there is reverse causality such that decreases in interest rates lead to increases in SPt. Nevertheless, the single equation approach does nothing to support that claim that SPt belongs in the Taylor rule equation. These results support the findings using the Johansen cointegration tests (that make no particular assumptions concerning weak exogeneity).
Next we consider the possibility that {cons_cont} is a variable missing from equation (3). Since {cons_cont} also behaves like an I(1) variable, we used the Johansen methodology to check for a cointegrating relationship between it, πt, yt and cons_cont. As reported in the lower portion of We experimented with the notion that only recent movements in the index, rather than its overall level, might be deemed important by the Federal Reserve. Towards this end, we constructed other measures of 'irrational exuberance,' such as a four-quarter moving average of the logarithmic change in the S & P Composite Index. Since a moving average of stock market returns is stationary, we did not search for a cointegrating relationship for it, πt, yt and our constructed measures. However, as suggested by Johansen and Juselius (1992), a stationary variable can be used as a conditioning variable in a test for cointegration. The notion is that a stationary covariate might enhance the power of the cointegration test since it controls for some of the deviations from the long-run equilibrium relationship. Dickey-Fuller tests indicated that the University of Michigan's expected change in interest rate (∆i e ) variable is I(0) over all sample periods considered. We did not find any reasonable cointegrating relationship among it, πt, yt, with any stationary measure of 'irrational exuberance' or with ∆i e . This concludes our exploration of the choice of variables. Since none of the other potential choices we explored improved the model, we will proceed with the original model as specified in equation (3). In the next section, we will explore the possibility that the subsamples used to estimate the model are improperly chosen.
Subsample choice
One possible reason for the poor performance of the Taylor rule is that the subsamples used in the estimations are improperly chosen. As such, it might be the case that an equation in the form of (1) is properly specified but that the break dates are incorrect. Estimating the model with a break where there is none will reduce the power of the cointegration test, increasing the likelihood that we are unable to reject the hypothesis of no cointegration. Testing for cointegration when a shift is undetected, will make the residuals appear to be integrated, and therefore make less likely that cointegration will be detected. Instead of prespecifying the breakpoints of each subsample, it is possible to use a completely data-driven method to select the break points. Bai and Perron (2003) show how to estimate the number of breaks and the break dates when the number and the location of breaks is unknown. As such, we applied the Bai-Perron procedure to the specification used in (3) using the full sample period. Specifically, we estimated the equation
where: j = 1, … , m + 1 and m is the number of breaks. Equation (4) allows for m breaks that manifest themselves by shifts in any or all of the coefficients in the equation. The first break occurs at t1 so that the duration of the first regime is from t = 1 until t = 1 t and the duration of the second regime is from 1 t + 1 to 2 t . Because the m-th break occurs at , m t t = the last regime begins at m t + 1 and lasts until the end of the data set. In applied work, the maximum number of breaks needs to be specified. We allowed for a maximum of number of 5 breaks. The procedure also required that we specify the minimum regime size (i.e., the minimum number of observations between breaks). We set the minimum duration of any regime to be 8 quarters. Table 3 . There seems to be at least two separate regimes. The first is the 1980:1 -1983:3 period, which stands out from the others in that the Federal Reserve responded strongly to both the output gap and the four-quarter inflation rate. Relative to the other periods, the coefficients on yt and πt are large and have low prob-values. Moreover, the Bai-Perron procedure indicates that this break date is the "most important" of the break dates.
The second regime seems to occur in two periods, 1968:4 -1979:4 and the 1984:1 -1997:4 . In these periods, the Federal Reserve followed a practice of interest rate smoothing (as measured by the coefficients on it-1 and it-2) and responded to the four-quarter inflation rate. While the breakpoints reported in period 2 do not exactly match those we have used, they are fairly similar. Thus it doesn't seem that the misspecification was caused by improperly chosen breakpoints. While permanent breaks constitute the simplest deviation from linearity, it is by no means the only plausible one. In the next section we will explore whether other types of nonlinearity might explain the unsatisfactory results obtained earlier.
Nonlinear Specifications
Allowing for the possibility of a nonlinear Taylor (1 )( )
where L is a measure of the Federal Reserve's overall loss, π * is the target inflation rate, and w is the weight placed on the output gap in the loss function.
Since yt and πt are linear functions of the federal funds rate, the control problem is to select the magnitude of the rate that minimizes the loss. A more complicated control problem would allow for some rigidity in the system so that the rate exhibits some persistence. Nevertheless, the solution from this linear-quadratic specification is a linear Taylor rule so that it is a linear function of yt and πt.
There are many reasons to suppose that the linear-quadratic framework is problematic. One possible source of nonlinearity is that the effect of the federal funds rate on the output gap or on the inflation rate may not be linear. It is often claimed that monetary policy is like 'pushing on a string.' To the extent that it is more difficult to eliminate a negative output gap than a positive gap, the Federal Reserve needs to decrease the federal funds rate more sharply than it increases the rate. Similarly, there are a number of theoretical and empirical papers suggesting that inflation increases more readily than it decreases. If it is more difficult to check inflation than to allow inflation, the Federal Reserve needs to produce a relatively small reduction in the federal funds rate when inflation is below the target. Another potential problem with the basic linear model is that a quadratic loss function implies that the Federal Reserve is equally concerned about high inflation and low inflation relative to the target rate. However, the recent concern about deflation implies that losses from a small negative inflation are larger than the losses from a small positive inflation. Even if we abstract from deflation, there is substantial reason to believe that the loss function is not symmetric around π * . The so-called 'inflation hawks' at the Fed would be more tolerant of an inflation rate that is 1% below target than inflation that is 1% above target. Similarly, a quadratic loss function assumes that the Fed is unconcerned about the sign of the output gap; 1-unit shortfall of output from potential produces the same loss as a 1-unit increase in output over potential. However, to many observers, negative output gaps in the two Bush presidencies were more substantial problems than the positive output gap in the Clinton years. These types of nonlinearities would imply that some sort of threshold model is
reasonable. Yet another source of nonlinearity would be if the standard assumption that the two losses in the loss function are separable were relaxed such that the loss resulting from inflation depended on the magnitude of the output gap. The non-separability of the loss function could help explain why the combination of low output and high inflation is more intolerable than high output and low inflation. Finally it is possible that changes in economic and political circumstances can induce changes in the weight that the Federal Reserve places on the output gap. Moreover, the target inflation rate need not be constant over time. These types of nonlinearities would imply either permanent breaks, which we examined in Section 4.2, or that we do not have a Taylor rule, in the case of a constantly changing inflation target.
To uncover any nonlinearities, we began by performing a number of diagnostic tests to help uncover any nonlinearities using various sample periods. The Regression Error Specification Test (RESET) posits the null hypothesis of linearity against a general alternative hypothesis of nonlinearity. Specifically, for the sample periods shown in Table 5 , we used the residuals from the estimated Taylor rule in the second stage regression: As shown in Panel 1 of Figure 5 , if a starting date of 1983:1 is used, the cusums begin to depart from the lower 5% confidence bound beginning almost immediately. Instead, if 1987:4 is used as the initial starting date, the cusums stay bounded within a ± 5% band for almost the entire sample period. Next we test for coefficient stability. We would not expect the coefficients to be stable over time given the results we have so far, but we are hoping to obtain some more concrete information. We use the coefficient stability test introduced in Hansen (1991).
We were surprised to find that Hansen's test for coefficient stability found little evidence of structural misspecification. The test indicates that the four equations using 1983:1 as a starting date have a non-constant value of β so that it is clearly possible to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the rule itself are constant. For example, as shown in Table 7 , the sample value of Hansen's test statistic for the intercept is 0.346. The critical values for the individual coefficients and variance are 0.470 and 0.748 at the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. The critical values for the joint test that all parameters, including the variance, are constant are 1.68 and 2.12 at the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. There seems to be more evidence of parameter instability using the starting date of 1987:4. However, it is not possible to pick out the particular parameters leading to the rejection of the joint test. Hansen (1997) shows how to appropriately perform an F-test test using a bootstrapping procedure. We used 4000 bootstrap replications for each of the sample periods listed in Table 8 and as expected, we found πt-1 was a better candidate for the threshold variable than πt-2, yt-1 or yt-2. When we used πt-1 as the threshold variable, we obtained:
10 Notice that it = α0 + α1πt + α2yt + a1it-1 + a2it-2 is easily transformed into it = α0 + α1πt + α2yt + α3it-1 + α4∆it-1 where α3 = a1 + a2 and α4 = − a2. Hence, the coefficient on it-1 is the standard measure of autoregressive persistence. Notice that there is strong evidence of threshold behavior using any sample period except 1983:1 -2003:4. The specification is such that it = α0 + α1πt + α2yt + α3it-1 + α4∆it-2 when inflation is above the threshold, and equal to it = (α0 + β0) + (α1 + β1)πt + (α2 + β2)yt + (α3 + β3)it-1 + (α4 + β4)∆it-2 when πt-1 is below the threshold value shown in the column labeled τ in Table 8 . The estimations for the sample periods beginning with 1987:4 are shown in Table 9 . Notice that all tell the same remarkable story. Notice that the weight placed on inflation is far greater than the weight placed on the output gap. It is also important to note that interest-rate persistence (as measured by the coefficient on it-1 = 0.507) is small compared to the standard estimates such as that in (2).
When inflation is below the threshold, the federal funds rate acts as a near random-walk process. The point estimates in Table 9 are such that α1 ≅ β1, α2 ≅ β2 and α3 + β3 ≅ 1. Also notice that the intercepts α0 and β0 are either insignificant and/or sum to a value near zero. Hence, when πt-1 ≤ τ, it is possible to approximate the estimated Taylor rules by the unit-root process:
These estimates stand in stark contrast to usual linear estimates of the Taylor rule. When inflation is below the threshold, the Federal Reserve has little incentive to alter interest rates.
The federal funds rate is kept relatively constant so that the rate has a substantial amount of persistence. The critical point is that there is a high-inflation and a low-inflation regime. In the low-inflation regime, the federal funds rate tends to be maintained at the prevailing level.
However, when inflation exceeds the threshold, the Federal Reserve responds to inflation (and to a limited extent the output gap) by increasing the federal funds rate. The linear estimates of the Taylor rule find excessive interest rate persistence since they combine these high-inflation and low-inflation periods into a single regime. Hence, in the linear estimates, the near-unit root regime is 'averaged' with a regime with moderate interest rate persistence. In addition this model explains why reaction to the output gap decreased over time when we estimated equation (3). In the latter part of the sample most of the observations fall in the low inflation regime where there is no reaction to the output gap. Similarly, the fact that the federal reserve bank let the federal funds rate "float" in this period would account for the appearance that the response to inflation decreased over time.
The threshold model seemingly provides a plausible explanation of the results obtained in the literature so far. Nevertheless, we seem to have come full circle since the threshold model acts as a model with a structural break. To explain, the Panel a in Figure 6 shows the time path of πt period we are not able to reject the null of no cointegration at conventional significance levels.
This finding of no cointegration supports the notion that the federal funds rate is not adjusted to the inflation rate or output gap in the low-inflation regime. Moreover, if we estimate a standard
Taylor rule for this period we obtain: it = 0.392 + 0.019πt + 0.064yt + 1.53it-1 -0.625∆it-1 (2.09) (0.148) (1.50) (13.48) (−5.84)
As such, the inflation rate and the income gap are insignificant so that the federal funds rate acts as a univariate process with a characteristic root near unity.
The point is that it is very hard to maintain the existence of a Taylor rule during the Greenspan period. We tried estimating the Taylor rule as smooth transition LSTAR and ESTAR processes. However, the estimations were very similar to that of the threshold model. This
should not be too surprising since, as shown in Figure 6 , the there are really only two regimes and the transition occurs rather abruptly.
Conclusion
In his original paper, Taylor (1993) made it clear that his rule was not intended to be a precise formula. In the Abstract, he states "An objective of the paper is to preserve the concept of such a policy rule in a policy environment where it is practically impossible to follow mechanically any particular algebraic formula that describes the policy rule." Similarly, in a recent theoretical paper, Svensson (2003) Given what we know about Alan Greenspan and the conduct of monetary policy, the only conclusion we can draw is that Taylor (1993) and Svensson (2003) were right. There is no doubt that the Federal Reserve pays attention to inflation and the output gap when deciding the course of monetary policy. The question is whether a simple mechanistic rule adequately describes the behavior of the federal funds rate. Our findings support the notion that there is no simple rule that is consistent with the data. 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
